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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee ("Hillside") does not dispute Appellant's ("Pomodoro") Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Hillside does not dispute If 1 of Pomodoro's Statement of the Issues. Hillside disputesfflf2
and 3 of Pomodoro's Statement of the Issues insofar as they imply that the trial court's legal analysis
was subject to any mandatory threshold review of equitable principles.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's stated Standard of Review, but would add that a
reviewing court "determine[s] only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Glover ex
rel. Dvson v. Bov Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's general Statement of the Case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Hillside does not dispute % 1 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts.

2.

Hillside does not dispute f 2 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts.

3.

Hillside does not dispute Pomodoro's general characterization of the lease renewal

option as contained in f 3 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts, but avers that the lease renewal option
document speaks for itself.

1

4.

Hillside denies that either Brian Morton or Wendy Caron objectively, affirmatively,

or unambiguously conveyed their express intent to Hillside or its representatives to exercise the lease
renewal option on behalf of Pomodoro. The portions of Brian Morton's affidavit cited as support
for the averment in ^f 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts that "Mr. Morton and Ms. Caron clearly
conveyed" their intent to exercise the option in fact do not support that averment. To the contrary,
nowhere in the cited portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit is there described or otherwise adequately
alleged a clear and unambiguous oral communication of Pomodoro's intent to renew, or a
corresponding clear and unambiguous oral communication of Hillside's waiver of the requirement
for a timely, written exercise of renewal. Instead, Mr. Morton's affidavit states Mr. Morton's
subjective belief ("I believed") about Hillside's agent's subjective belief ("impression").1 This
averment of a double-layered subjective belief does not rise to the level of "clearly conveyed" as
alleged in f 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts. Mr. Morton's affidavit does not support

1

The relevant portions of Brian Morton's affidavit cited as support read as follows:

8.
My partner, Wendy Caron and I had prior to the April 24, 1997
meeting discussed our intent to renew the lease, and went to this meeting on April
24, 1997 with the purpose of expressing that intent to [Hillside's] agent.
9.
It was obvious to me, and /believed obvious to [Hillside's] agent, that
we were not going to make improvements on the leasehold premises and then leave
at the end of the year. As such, at the conclusion of that meeting, / believed that
[Hillside's] agent left with the impression that by making the improvements on the
premises we intended to renew.
(Emphasis added.)
2

Pomodoro's characterization of "clearly conveyed," and as such, the "clearly conveyed" language
in If 4 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts has no evidentiary basis and is a patent mischaracterization
of the communications (or the lack thereof) between the parties on April 24, 1997.
5.

Hillside does not dispute the allegations of ^ 5 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts, but

avers that all repairs and improvements alleged in f 5 were contractual duties of Pomodoro pursuant
to K 11 of the underlying Lease Agreement.2

2

Paragraph 11 of the Lease Agreement, entitled "Repairs," places on Pomodoro, as
tenant, a total obligation to maintain the entire leasehold premises at its own cost. Paragraph 11
reads as follows:
Tenant shall, at its sole cost, keep and maintain (including replacements if
necessary) the Demised Premises (excluding exterior structural walls and roofs
which Landlord agrees to repair, but including the interior surface of exterior walls
and all windows, doors, and glass) including the store front (including store front
metal work and signs) and the interior of the Premises, in clean, good, and sanitary
order, condition and repair, and promptly replace any glass which may be damaged
or broken with glass of the same quality, hereby waiving all right to make repairs or
replacements at the expense of Landlord. Tenant shall keep its sewers and drains
open and clear and shall keep the sidewalk adjacent to the Demised Premises clean.
Tenant agrees that not less often than every fourth year it will paint, varnish,
wallpaper, or otherwise redecorate or renovate the interior of the Demised
Premises, including Tenant trade fixtures. By entry hereunder, Tenant accepts the
Premises as being in good and sanitary order, condition and repair and agrees on the
last day of said term, or sooner termination of this lease, to surrender unto Landlord
the Premises in the same condition as when received, reasonable [wear] and tear
excepted, and to remove all of tenant's signs and trade fixtures from the Premises.
During the term of this lease Tenant shall keep in force a preventative
maintenance contract with a qualified mechanical contractor covering any heating

3

6.

Hillside does not dispute the allegations of f 6 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts.

7.

Hillside does not dispute the allegations of f 7 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts

insofar as they characterize the untimely nature of Pomodoro's exercise of notice as six days late.
However, Hillside does dispute the allegations of ^ 7 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts insofar as
they allege: (1) that Pomodoro or its representatives ever clearly or expressly communicated to
Hillside or its representatives Pomodoro's intention to renew the lease (for the reasons outlined in
If 4 above); (2) that Hillside's knowledge of Pomodoro's capital improvements to the leasehold
premises in any way constituted knowledge on Hillside's part of Pomodoro's uncommunicated and
subjective intent to renew,3 or that such improvements would not have been made absent an intention

or air conditioning equipment located on the Premises, and upon request, shall
provide Landlord with copy of said Contract.
(Emphasis added.)
3

Again, the cited portions of Brian Morton's affidavit do not support this contention.
The relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit read as follows:
15.
. . . Neither Johnson, nor any other agent of [Hillside] ever inquired of us as
to why we would make such costly improvements unless we intended to renew the
lease.
17.
The delay in six (6) days in giving written notice was based upon a belief on
our part that Johnson already had notice that we were to remain, based upon . . . the
improvements on the leasehold premises.
19.
Our delay of six (6) days was not willful; rather, it was based upon our belief
that we had complied with the provisions of the lease by . . . making improvements.
4

to renew4; and (3) that Pomodoro or its representatives ever gave verbal notice of intent to renew,
or that Pomodoro's or its representatives' "reasonable belief as to the effectiveness of their
alternative and unauthorized exercise of renewal in any way overcame the clear and unambiguous
contractual requirement of a timely, written notice.5

Again, Mr. Morton makes no averment of direct and unambiguous communication by either party
to the other that improvements served as a notice of intent to renew. And again, Pomodoro is relying
on Mr. Morton's double-layered subjectivity to impermissibly support a communication of notice:
Mr. Morton believed that Hillside apprehended Mr. Morton's unspoken intent to renew based on
improvements for which Pomodoro was already contractually obligated. Mr. Morton's affidavit fails
to allege any communication apprising Hillside that such improvements would not have been made
absent an intent to renew. Therefore, Pomodoro's allegation to that effect in f 7 of its Statement of
Facts has no evidentiary basis and is another plain mischaracterization of Brian Morton's affidavit.
4

Because the improvements listed in ^f 5 of Pomodoro's Statement of Facts were
improvements for which Pomodoro was obligated under ]f 11 of the underlying Lease Agreement,
it does not logically follow that Hillside's knowledge of such improvements necessarily entails a
knowledge of Pomodoro's uncommunicated and subjective intent to renew.
5

Again, the cited portions of Brian Morton's affidavit do not support this contention.
The relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit read as follows:
17.
The delay in six (6) days in giving written notice was based upon a belief on
our part that Johnson already had notice that we were to remain, based upon the April
meeting . . . [ . ]
19.
Our delay of six (6) days was not willful; rather, it was based upon our belief
that we had complied with the provisions of the lease by giving notice at the April
meeting . . . [ . ]
As pointed out in footnote 1 above, the portion of Mr. Morton's affidavit actually describing the
April meeting never alleges a direct and unambiguous oral communication of intent to renew, but
only alleges Mr. Morton's subjective impression of Hillside's representative's purported belief.

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pomodoro failed to raise any issues of material fact in its affidavit opposing summary
judgment below. None of the putative "material facts" raised by Pomodoro in its Appellant Brief
were present in or were supported by its opposing affidavit. As such, the trial court was correct in
finding no issues of material fact.
Neither the I.X.L. nor Geisdorf cases require a routine preliminary examination of the
equities prior to strictly enforcing an option provision, as is incorrectly suggested by Pomodoro.
Rather, a court will strictly construe an option provision as a matter of law unless an optionee can
show specific facts. (1) that meet the specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); and (2) that
demonstrate "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" circumstances, i.e., that an optionee's failure
to properly exercise an option renewal was due to circumstances beyond the optionee's own
inadvertence or was the result of the optionor's affirmative acts preventing the optionee's exercise.
The burden is on the optionee to meet this essentially two-part test; a trial court does not have a
threshold "duty" to conduct an equitable examination as a matter of course. Where an optionee fails
to show such facts with specificity, as was the case with Pomodoro, a trial court is correct in strictly
construing an option's provisions as a matter of law.

Any examination of the equities is

Therefore, Pomodoro's allegation of "giving verbal notice of intent" at the April 1997 meeting in
f 7 of its Statement of Facts has no evidentiary basis and is another plain mischaracterization.

6

discretionary and is dependent on the optionee first meeting a necessarily high burden of alleging
specific facts meriting an equitable exception to strict construal. Indeed, Geisdorf indicates that
where an optionee fails to meet this burden, a court must strictly construe an option's provisions as
a matter of law.
Pomodoro has failed to adequately allege waiver, since its opposing affidavit below neither
alleges instances of Hillside's distinct intent to waive or, taking Hillside's alleged actions as a whole,
an unambiguous intent to waive. Pomodoro has failed to adequately allege a course of dealing acting
as a waiver, since acts done under a bilateral contract, requiring a lower standard of substantial
compliance, cannot be used to justify non-compliance with the terms of an option, which requires
a higher standard of strict compliance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING NO GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT.
The trial court below granted Hillside summary judgment on the basis that "[t]he Court finds

no genuine issues of material fact." (Summary Judgment, ^ 1.) Pomodoro challenges this basis of
the trial court's ruling by contending that there actually were genuine issues of material fact raised
below, and that if the trial court had considered such material "facts" as were purportedly raised by
Pomodoro below, the court "would have been forced to conclude that there are material factual
questions to be resolved in this matter and that a trial is required" (Aplt. Brief at 7), and that
summary judgment was therefore unmerited.
7

Pomodoro relies on Brian Morton's affidavit as sole support for its putative "material facts."
Yet a careful examination of Mr. Morton's affidavit reveals that it neither rehearses nor otherwise
supports any "material facts" cited in Pomodoro's Brief, nor can such facts be inferred, as a matter
of logic, from that affidavit's statements.
A.

Capital Improvements Triggering Renewal.

Pomodoro presents the following as a "material fact" allegedly produced in the trial court
below: "According to Pomodoro's testimony, Pomodoro stated to Hillside's agent, Mr. Johnson, that
Pomodoro would renew the Lease if Pomodoro proceeded with certain capital improvements." (Aplt.
Brief at 6; emphasis added.)
Mr. Morton's affidavit does not support this contention, since nowhere in that document does
Mr. Morton affirmatively represent that such a statement was ever made. The closest the affidavit
comes to describing such a "statement" (if anything, it describes the utter lack of such a statement),
are the following paragraphs:
8.
My partner, Wendy Caron and I had prior to the April 24, 1997 meeting [with
Hillside's agent, Mr. Johnson] discussed our intent to renew the lease, and went to
this meeting on April 24, 1997 with the purpose of expressing that intent to
[Hillside's] agent.
9.
It was obvious to me, and I believed it was obvious to [Hillside's] agent, that
we were not going to make improvements on the leasehold premises and then leave
at the end of the year. As such, at the conclusion of that meeting, I believed that
[Hillside's] agent left with the impression that by making the improvements on the
premises we intended to renew.

8

Nowhere in the above passage is there described or represented a "statement" that Pomodoro
would renew the lease by making capital improvements. Nor is such an inference merited. As
discussed above, at most, Mr. Morton's affidavit describes a compounded subjectivity: Mr. Morton's
subjective understanding of Mr. Johnson's subjective understanding of Mr. Morton's unspoken
intent.
It is precisely to avoid the confusion and possibilities for misunderstanding inherent in such
subjective second-guessing that Utah courts strictly construe written option provisions according to
their objective written terms. Also, Pomodoro fails to explain-if improvements in and of themselves
acted as an effective exercise of the option, and were understood by both parties to act as such—why
Pomodoro even bothered to later serve a written notice of exercise after having made improvements.
B.

Hillside's Acquiescence in Capital Improvements as Acceptance of Renewal.

Pomodoro presents the following as a "material fact" allegedly produced in the trial court
below: "Further, Pomodoro submits that Mr. Johnson, as agent for Hillside, acknowledged
Pomodoro's position; observed and monitored Pomodoro's construction and installation of the
capital improvements; and accepted the capital improvements as a permanent part of the leased
premises." (Aplt. Brief at 6.)
Nowhere in Mr. Morton's affidavit is there a representation that Mr. Johnson made an
unambiguous and objective communication "acknowledging" Pomodoro's position. At most, Mr.
Morton states what he thought was Mr. Johnson's "impression." (Affidavit of Brian Morton, ^J 9.)

9

Mr. Morton's subjective belief as to Mr. Johnson's "impression" is not tantamount to Mr. Johnson's
"acknowledgment" of Pomodoro's position.
Neither is there any objective representation that Mr. Johnson "observed and monitored"
Pomodoro's capital improvements. Again, Mr. Morton frames such a contention in terms of his
subjective belief:
We were led to believe that [Hillside's] agent, Johnson, personally observed these
improvements to the premises.
(Affidavit of Brian Morton, Tf 15; emphasis added.) Again, Mr. Morton falls short of making an
unambiguous, objective statement, but instead couches his representation in terms of subjective and
largely unverifiable "belief." Such subjective belief, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact.
However, even assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that Mr. Johnson both knew of and
accepted Pomodoro's capital improvements, it does not logically follow that such knowledge and
acceptance served as either an acceptance of alternative exercise of the renewal option or a waiver
of the operative mode of option exercise already in place. Among other things, each of the capital
improvements identified in Mr. Morton's affidavit arguably come under Pomodoro's tenant
obligations as outlined in part in Tf 11 of the Lease Agreement, requiring Pomodoro to make certain
improvements and be responsible for certain repairs. In other words, Mr. Johnson could have known
of and accepted Pomodoro's capital improvements not because he knew or expected such
improvements to act as an alternate form of option exercise, but because such improvements were
10

in fact required of Pomodoro under the express terms of the Lease Agreement. Because Pomodoro
has neither addressed nor discounted this possibility (which Hillside asserts was in fact the case), it
cannot expect Hillside's knowledge of improvements, by itself, to logically lead to the conclusion
of Hillside's putative knowledge of Pomodoro's alternative exercise of option.
C.

The Parties' "Understanding" of No Need for Written Exercise of Option.

Pomodoro further asserts: "However, it is Pomodoro's position . . . that Pomodoro didn't
overlook the requirement of a writing, but rather believed, consistent with the understanding between
Pomodoro and Mr. Johnson [Hillside's agent], that a writing [of intent to exercise the option] was
unnecessary under these circumstances." (Aplt. Brief at 7.)
As discussed above, a "belief as to an "understanding" that has never been alleged to be
clearly and unequivocally communicated does not rise to the level of material fact.

This

shortcoming was discussed in If 4 of Hillside's Statement of Facts above, and Hillside's discussion
and analysis there of the term "clearly conveyed" is equally applicable to the term "understanding"
as used by Pomodoro on page 7 of its Appellant Brief. In other words, an "understanding" is a
mutual recognition reached after a clear and unequivocal oral or written communication from one
party to another; it is not the compounded subjectivity suggested by Pomodoro, i.e., Pomodoro's
subjective belief as to Hillside's subjective understanding as to Pomodoro's belief. As discussed
above, the relevant portions of Mr. Morton's affidavit do not contain any allegations of clear and
unequivocal communications of intent or waiver, but are couched in the soft terms of "belief and

11

"impression."
None of the "facts" that Pomodoro lists in Section I of its Argument has been established as
a material fact. Each such "fact" either mischaracterizes the actual assertions made in Mr. Morton's
affidavit, or is unsupportable from the representations of Mr. Morton's affidavit as taken at face
value. As such, Pomodoro fails to meet the clear requirement of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). That rule
requires that a party seeking to oppose a motion for summary judgment by means of affidavit "must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" (emphasis added). As
demonstrated above, Brian Morton's affidavit failed to set forth any specific facts creating genuine
issues of material facts. And as also demonstrated above, Pomodoro's assertion of "material facts"
are the product of innuendo, mischaracterization, or subjective supposition; they do not arise out of
any specific facts set forth in the affidavit of Brian Morton. As such, the trial court was entirely
correct in concluding that Pomodoro had failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact below.
II.

ANY EQUITABLE ANALYSIS BY A TRIAL COURT WHEN CONSTRUING AN
OPTION PROVISION IS DISCRETIONARY, NOT MANDATORY.
A.

The I.X.L. case was correctly applied.

Pomodoro attempts to distinguish the fact pattern in this case from the fact pattern in the
then-controlling case of I.X.L. Furniture and Carpet Installation House v. Berets, 91 P. 279 (Utah
1907),6 and misleadlingly labels such differences as "extremely significant."

6

Subsequent to the trial court's issuance of summary judgment, the Supreme Court
issued its decision in Geisdorf v. Doughty, 345 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1998), which, as
12

1.

Date of Option Exercise.

The first "important factual distinction" Pomodoro suggests is that in I.X.L.. the "expiration
date of the lease [was] the last date to renew," whereas in the present case, Pomodoro delivered its
written notice of renewal "almost four (4) months before the primary term ended."
If Pomodoro is suggesting that proximity of lease expiration date to the deadline for notice
is somehow a distinction between the two cases, it has raised a false distinction. If it is suggesting
that I.X.L. stands for the proposition that a lease's expiration date acts as the deadline for exercising
an option, it has misread and misrepresented that case. While the I.X.L. court recognizes that a lease
renewal option not specifying the date by which exercise must be made will be construed as
requiring exercise on or before expiration, it also recognizes that parties to a lease can set a renewal
deadline on a date other than the expiration date. 91 P. at 282 ("if the parties had named a given date
on which the request must be made, that day would control"). I.X.L. is therefore supportive of the
proposition that the parties to an option can set both the time and manner for exercise, and that such
a time can be any other date prior to expiration that the parties may see fit to choose. Indeed, almost
any commercial option contract will specify a renewal deadline that is prior to, rather than
coextensive with, expiration. It is a basic premise of contract law that the parties to a contract can
determine the material terms of their contract, especially where such terms have a time or value
component.

demonstrated below, reaffirms the principles outlined in I.X.L.
13

In the instant case, we have parties who, by contract, set the deadline for exercise at 120 days
prior to the lease expiration date. In I.X.L.. the parties, by the language of their option agreement
set the exercise deadline for the same day as expiration. Therefore, this case and I.X.L. are
indistinguishable in this regard: parties to a lease, by contract, can set a deadline by which to exercise
an option, and exercise of that option will be strictly construed to have occurred in the manner and
time outlined by the parties' written agreement.
2.

Examination of the Equities.

Second, Pomodoro cites the I.X.L. case as support for the proposition that a trial court has
"a duty . . . to review all of the facts which support claims for equitable relief," and that an
"examination of the equities" is required. Pomodoro's argument is unavailing on any one of three
levels: (1) I.X.L. does not compel a mandatory equitable review, but rather permits discretionary
review; (2) the facts of this case do not merit examination of the equities or equitable relief; and (3)
Pomodoro did not allege "specific facts" meriting examination of the equities or equitable relief.
a.

Discretionary Equitable Review.

The I.X.L. court makes it clear that a trial court has
no right to disregard any provisions of a contract, or to save rights that are lost
thereunder through the act of a party asking relief, unless it is made to appear that it
would be unconscionable or clearly inequitable to do or not to do so.
91 P. at 283 (emphasis added). In other words, a trial court must strictly construe the express terms
of an option contract unless an optionee can demonstrate "unconscionable or clearly inequitable"

14

facts. By virtue of Utah R. Civ. 56(e), any such allegations must be based on "specific facts." The
"unconscionable or clearly inequitable" standard is a necessarily high one. Because an option's
provisions are subject to a standard of strict construal, it follows that any challenge to those
provisions on equitable grounds must necessarily meet a correspondingly strict burden of proof. The
I.X.L. court validates this proposition by explaining that the "unconscionable or clearly inequitable"
standard may be met in only clearly extraordinary circumstances, such as where the optionor
conceals the terms of exercise from the optionee, or where the optionor otherwise affirmatively
prevents the optionee from exercising its option. In other words, consideration of equitable factors
is a necessarily high standard that applies only in circumstances where the optionor has somehow
affirmatively prevented the optionee's exercise. It does not apply to any and all instances of
unfairness or harm. In particular, it does not apply to circumstances where the optionee's own
carelessness or inadvertence is the cause of its failure to exercise.
b.

No Facts Alleged Requiring Equitable Review.

Moreover, the I.X.L. court found that the "unconscionable or clearly inequitable" standard
did not apply to that case even assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations. In other words, the
trial court in I.X.L. correctly exercised its discretion not to engage in an examination of the equities.
Similar to Pomodoro, the I.X.L. plaintiff argued, among other things, that it had made costly

15

improvements to the leasehold premises at issue,7 and that it had made the landlord aware of its
intention to exercise its option through daily conversations over a month-long period.8 The I.X.L.
court held that even granting the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations, the plaintiff had still failed
to allege the type of inequity that would circumvent strict construal of the option's unambiguous
provisions. The I.X.L. plaintiffs failure to timely exercise was not due to any fraud, concealment,
or other affirmatively inequitable behavior on the part of the landlord. To the contrary, exercise of
the lease provision, in the time and manner specified by the written agreement, entailed requirements
of which the tenant either already knew or had the ready means of ascertaining. Therefore, any
failure to exercise was due to the tenant's own inadvertence, and as such, it would not be

7

In I.X.L.. the tenant had made improvements worth $750, or 7.5 times its monthly
rent of $100. Here, Pomodoro claims to have made improvements worth approximately $50,000,
or 9.6 times the fair rental value of the leasehold premises ($5,200), a ratio roughly comparable to
that of the I.X.L. tenant. Furthermore, if we only factor in those improvements specifically alleged
in the affidavit of Brian Morton (Tffl 10-13), totaling approximately $26,500, then Pomodoro's
specifically alleged improvements are only 5 times the fair rental value of the premises, well below
that of the I.X.L. tenant.
8

The I.X.L. tenant alleged that its officers

met and talked with one of the respondents almost daily, and frequently did so with
another of the respondents, and that both said respondents knew and were fully aware
during all of said time, and long before the expiration of said lease, that appellant had
elected and intended to continue said lease and in the occupation of said premisesf.]"
91 P. at 279.
16

"unconscionable or clearly inequitable" for the court to enforce the option according to its clear and
written terms.
That same analysis is supportive of the trial court's decision below. Pomodoro has not
alleged any conduct on the part of Hillside that in any way prevented Pomodoro from exercising
written notice in a timely manner. Such requirements were either known to or ascertainable by
Pomodoro,9 and its failure to either ascertain or follow them does not entitle it to equitable relief
negating the clear terms of the written option agreement.
c.

Failure to Allege Specific Facts.

Even conceding, solely for the sake of argument, that the trial court had some duty to
examine the equities prior to construing the option provisions, Pomodoro has failed to allege any
specific facts meriting an equitable review (as has been demonstrated in Section I above). Pomodoro
has failed to adequately allege specific communications between the parties conveying an intent to
exercise alternative means of exercise or an intent to waive contractually-required means of exercise.
Pomodoro has not alleged as specific facts any actions on the part of Hillside that effectively denied

9

Pomodoro's principals were aware of the option provisions, or, if not aware, had the
documents in hand to ascertain them. The affidavit of Brian Morton alleges:
I indicated to [Hillside's agent] that we did not wish to renegotiate the lease since we
already had a lease which had two (2) renewal options available to us. At that point,
my partner, Wendy Caron, retrieved the lease for Johnson and pointed out to him that
there were two (2) five (5) year renewal terms available under the present lease.
(Affidavit of Brian Morton, ^ 6.)
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Pomodoro a chance to exercise its option in a proper fashion. Pomodoro has not alleged any specific
facts showing that it did not know or could not ascertain the requirements of exercise, or that even
if it did not, why such ignorance or inability represents anything other than self-defeating
inadvertence.
d.

I.X.L. Standard of Discretionary Review.

I.X.L. did not require a trial court, as an affirmative duty, to engage in an examination of
equities prior to construing an option's provisions. Rather, it indicated such an examination is at
best discretionary, and is triggered only in instances where an optionee is somehow prevented from
exercising the option due to the clearly inequitable conduct of the optionor (but not in instances
where the ability to exercise is clearly within the optionee's power but it nevertheless fails to do so).
This suggests that unless Pomodoro could adduce a certain quality of facts supporting its
equitable argument, the trial court was in fact required to strictly construe the provisions of the
option agreement as a matter of law. Pomodoro attempts to impermissibly shift its own burden onto
the trial court by suggesting that an examination of the equities is somehow a mandatory or
preliminary inquiry. It is in fact Pomodoro who bore the burden of demonstrating equitable
circumstances; the trial court had no preexisting duty to examine equities as a matter of course.
This further suggests that in the present instance, Pomodoro had a two-fold burden of proof
before the trial court could have conducted any examination of equities. First, Pomodoro had to
allege "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" facts with specificity as required by Utah R. Civ.
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P. 56(e). It could not throw out unsupported opinion, innuendo, or subjective impressions and
expect the same to trigger an examination of the equities precluding strict construal of a clear and
unambiguous option provision. As detailed in Section I above, Pomodoro clearly has failed to do
that.

Second, Pomodoro had to meet the necessarily high standard of demonstrating

"unconscionable and clearly inequitable" facts, i.e., affirmative actions on the part of Hillside to
prevent Pomodoro's exercise of its option. It has failed to offer any such facts. The worst Hillside
could be accused of, based on the affidavit of Brian Morton, is silence, which acts neither as an
effective waiver nor as the type of behavior preventing Pomodoro's exercise of its renewal option.
It follows that where the means of exercise were both known to Pomodoro and solely within
Pomodoro's control, Hillside cannot be said to have prevented exercise. It also follows that where
Pomodoro has failed to meet its burden of proof as to either specificity or quality of facts, it has no
"entitlement" to equitable review.
Therefore, absent any demonstration of "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" conduct
on the part of an optionor, construal and enforcement of an option provision is a legal and not
equitable matter. Pomodoro failed to allege any "unconscionable and clearly inequitable" conduct
on the part of Hillside. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that the option scenario before it was
"a legal issue and not an equitable one" was entirely correct as well as consonant with the reasoning
of the I.X.L. court.
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e.

Geisdorf Reaffirms I.X.L.-Type Discretionary Review.

Pomodoro is in part correct when it asserts that the recent case of Geisdorf v. Doughty. 345
Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (Utah 1998) ratifies the requirements set forth in I.X.L.. but is incorrect, as
demonstrated above, in asserting that I.X.L. (or Geisdorf) requires any mandatory, threshold
examination of the equities prior to construing an option's provisions. In fact, Geisdorf reaffirms
the discretionary nature of such review as laid down in I.X.L.. First, it notes, at some length, that
"performance of an option requires strict compliance" and that exercise must be "unconditionally
and precisely according to the terms of the option." 345 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 (citations omitted).
Second, it recognizes that equitable considerations may justify deviation from the rule of strict
construal, but only in very limited circumstances. Like I.X.L.. Geisdorf identifies such instances as
being extraordinary, such as "exigent circumstances beyond [the parties'] control," "honest and
justifiable mistake," and "where the strict compliance was prevented by some act of the optionor."
Id. at 18-19. And like I.X.L.. it expressly excludes as an equitable exception to the rule of strict
construal those instances where a failure to exercise is due to "willful or gross negligence on the part
of the optionee[.]" Id at 19.
Geisdorf says nothing that would support the notion that an examination of equities is a
mandatory, preliminary inquiry that a court must carry out as a matter of course. Rather, like I.X.L..
it indicates that a court has a duty to strictly construe option provisions, and that any examination
of equities will take place only where an optionee alleges specific facts meeting the necessarily high
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standard of extraordinarily inequitable results. IdL ("In the absence of some supervening, excusing
instance, this court has no choice but to require strict compliance with the terms of the Lease
Agreement"; emphasis added.) Where allegations of an "excusing instance" either fail to meet the
specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e), or to allege the extraordinary circumstances
contemplated by I.X.L. and Geisdorf. then a court must strictly construe an option's provisions as
a matter of law. Therefore, given the fact that the affidavit of Brian Morton failed to allege specific
facts or extraordinary circumstances that would merit an examination of equities, the trial court
below was entirely correct to strictly construe the option's notice provision as a matter of law.
Finally, Pomodoro gives the misleading impression that a trial court's consideration of
"instances in which deviation from strict compliance may be equitably excused," Id at 19, is
governed by a "totality of the circumstances inquiry." Id at 20. In fact, the Geisdorf court does not
equate the two, and does not mandate a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry for the broad issue
of equitable exceptions to strict construal. It speaks of a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry only
in regard to the narrow issue of waiver implied from conduct. It does not speak of a "totality of the
circumstances" inquiry as in any way preliminary or mandatory to a court's construal of option
provisions.
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f.

Pomodoro Cannot Avail Itself of the "Honest Mistake" Equitable
Exception to Strict Construal, Since Both Its Waiver and Course of
Dealing Arguments Necessarily Fail.

Pomodoro tries to avail itself of the "honest and justifiable mistake" equitable exception
identified in Geisdorf. This exception is unavailable to Pomodoro for several reasons. First, there
is no question that the knowledge, means, and ability to exercise timely written notice were available
to Pomodoro at all times. A party to an arms-length contract is assumed to know the contents of that
contract, and is thereby "obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his own
interests." Geisdorf. 345 Utah Adv. at 20 (citations and emphasis omitted). Where a party is a
signatory to a contract, and has his own copy of the same to which he can refer, requirements for
time and manner of notice of exercise are "reasonably within the knowledge of both parties." Id
"[E]ach party has the burden to read and understand the terms of a contract before he or she affixes
his or her signature to it." Id This duty is ongoing: each such party has a responsibility "to keep
himself informed about the continuing provisions under the Lease Agreement and to protect his
interests, both current and future, in the leased property." Id

Here, Pomodoro had the duty to

know and be familiar with the contents of the option agreement. The evidence suggests that its
principals did. See Affidavit of Brian Morton, 16. Pomodoro has not provided any compelling facts
that would relieve it of its clear duty to inform itself and protect its interests.
Second, Pomodoro has not adequately alleged implied waiver in a manner that would relieve
Pomodoro of its duty to inform itself and protect its interests. The affidavit of Brian Morton never
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alleges a clear, unequivocal waiver by Hillside or its representatives of the requirement for timely,
written notice. This is not an instance where waiver can be implied from silence, see Geisdorf. 345
Utah Adv. Rep. at 20, so Pomodoro necessarily is left with arguing that Hillside's waiver is implied
from its conduct.

Because option contracts are subject to the strict construal standard of

interpretation and enforcement, waiver of such provisions is subject to a correspondingly strict
standard of proof. kL at 19 ("Since the performance of options requires a stricter standard than
performance of bilateral contracts, it logically follows that a stricter standard is necessary for the
waiver of option contracts than that which is required for waiver of bilateral contract provisions.")
The plaintiff in Geisdorf attempted the same argument, on nearly identical facts. Like
Pomodoro, the Geisdorf plaintiff argued that waiver could be implied from the "premise that [the
landlord] knew or believed that [the tenant] would exercise his option to renew." He also argued that
a verbal intent to renew was given prior to his untimely written notice. Similar to Pomodoro, the
Geisdorf plaintiff relied on allegations of meetings between the parties "from which no distinct intent
to waive the written notice requirement could reasonably be drawn." The Geisdorf court found that
none of the instances alleged by the plaintiff rose to the level of "distinct intent," and that the several
instances of arguably "indistinct intent" taken as a whole could not "reasonably evince unambiguous
intent." Id Of particular note, the Geisdorf court found that the plaintiffs representations as to the
parties' beliefs were not compelling evidence of waiver:
[The tenant's] belief of what [the landlord] knew or should have known does not
distinctly indicate whether she intended to waive notice. Similarly, [the landlord's]
23

assumed knowledge of [the tenant's] intent to exercise the option does not work a
waiver of the requirement. . . Furthermore, neither the discussion about the future
payment schedule nor the consultation about painting the building provides distinct
inferences to support an intent to waive written notice; myriad possible conclusions
can be drawn from either instance.
Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). The same analysis is equally applicable to the affidavit of Brian
Morton. Nowhere does it identify an instance of distinct intent on the part of Pomodoro to waive.
Mr. Morton's belief about what Hillside or it representatives knew or should have known does not
evidence a distinct intent to waive. Discussions about improvements cannot act as distinct
inferences of intent to waive, since other possibilities exist, e.g., Hillside understood such
improvements to be part of Pomodoro's contractual duties as tenant. And the suggested instances
of indistinct intent, as alleged by way of subjective impressions and suppositions, taken as a whole,
do not manifest an unambiguous intent to waive on the part of Hillside.
The fact that waiver issues are "highly fact-dependent" does not work in Pomodoro's favor.
Pomodoro cannot avail itself of a "highly fact-dependent" issue by merely in canting the term
"waiver" while at the same time failing to meet the specificity requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Pomodoro cannot invoke the "highly fact-dependent" nature of waiver where it has failed to adduce
or allege any material facts that would create issues of material fact as to waiver. Pomodoro cannot
assert waiver-related "facts" in its memoranda where those "facts" find no support or unambiguous
expression in the affidavit of Brian Morton. Quite simply, Pomodoro failed in its burden to allege
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specific material facts below, and cannot now complain that the trial court decided the matter as an
issue of law when Pomodoro's own deficiencies left the trial court no other choice.
Third, although this point was discussed in some detail above, it bears reiteration since
Pomodoro continues to misrepresent unsupported allegations as "material facts" asserted below:
Nowhere in Mr. Morton's affidavit is there support for the allegation that Pomodoro "advised" or
made a "statement" to Hillside that Pomodoro's improvements would act as alternative exercise of
its option. Even if it had, it has failed to adequately allege any waiver, either by word or act, on the
part of Hillside. As such, Pomodoro could not base a "belief that written notice was no longer
necessary on a statement that was never made. And it follows that Pomodoro's questionable "belief
in a non-statement cannot qualify it for the "honest and justifiable mistake" exception to strict
construal. Mr. Morton's affidavit does not allege any express, unequivocal facts that would justify
Pomodoro's "belief that it did not have to strictly comply with the option's exercise requirements.
As such, this Court should discount all misrepresentations in Section II.D. of Pomodoro's Appellant
Brief that are at variance with or find no support in the plain language of Brian Morton's affidavit.
The points discussed above likewise serve to invalidate Pomodoro's argument that the
parties' "course of dealing" gave Pomodoro a "reasonable expectation that the written notice
requirement of the renewal provisions of the Lease would not be enforced."10 Pomodoro alleges that

10

The relevant portion of Brian Morton's affidavit that addresses this issue reads as

follows:
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Hillside had not required strict performance "with other provisions of the lease."1 ] However, there
is a qualitative difference between bilateral contracts and option provisions. A bilateral contract may
require at best substantial compliance, while an option provision, which is essentially an offer that
must be accepted according to its exact terms, is subject to a strict compliance standard rather than
a substantial compliance standard. Geisdorf 345 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. By comparing lease
provisions with option provisions, Pomodoro is comparing apples with oranges. The underlying
bilateral lease agreement is subject to a lower standard of compliance than is the option provision.
It follows that a course of dealing in regard to the document subject to the lower standard of
compliance cannot act to waive the requirements of a document with a higher standard of
compliance. The assertion that Hillside waived strict compliance with other lease provisions (though
Pomodoro has failed to state with any specificity the affected provisions, or the time and manner of
waiver) is meaningless, since Hillside was under no duty of strict compliance with regard to lease
provisions (but was rather under a substantial compliance standard).

Over the prior three (3) years of the lease, we received notice from the landlord prior
to September as to what the escalation in the rent would be, and we waited until that
notice before we began paying new rent. We believed that the landlord would send
us a similar notice with respect to the renewal, and simply forgot about the written
requirement until we received Johnson's letter of September 3, 1997.
11

Pomodoro has not alleged any specific instances of Hillside's not requiring "strict
compliance with other provisions of the Lease." No such instances are ascertainable from the
affidavit of Brian Morton. Hillside's courtesy in providing advance notice of rent escalation, as
mentioned in U 18 of Brian Morton's affidavit, does not equate to a waiver of Pomodoro's
compliance with lease provisions.
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B.

Pomodoro's Alleged "Undue Hardship" Does Not Merit Equitable Relief.

Pomodoro alleges several types of harm stemming from its inability to renew the lease, such
as loss of expenditures made toward capital improvements (which, as discussed elsewhere, were
tenant obligations under the lease in any event) and loss of commercial good will associated with
the leasehold location, as meriting equitable relief. The same types of harm were raised by the I.X.L.
plaintiff, and were rejected by the I.X.L. court as insufficient bases for equitable relief. As was the
case in I.X.L.. any harm accruing to Pomodoro was of its own making. Pomodoro had within its
power, throughout the time period in question, knowledge of and ability to exercise the option in the
contractually-specified manner. There is no allegation that Hillside either concealed such terms from
Pomodoro or otherwise affirmatively prevented Pomodoro from exercising timely, written exercise.
Furthermore, Pomodoro can claim no forfeiture or loss of right. It did not lose any
contractual rights by its failure to timely exercise. It was not deprived of anything it already had.
At most, it "lost nothing but an opportunity by not performing a condition required of it[.]" I.X.L..
91 P. at 283 (emphasis added). Lost opportunities, particularly where they are the result of an
optionee's own inadvertence, and no matter how regrettable, are not actionable, let alone the subject
for equitable relief that would circumvent the clear and ambiguous terms of an option provision.
CONCLUSION
For the all of the foregoing reasons, Pomodoro's appeal should be dismissed.
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ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1).
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this Q ^ day of February, 1999.

KESLER & RUST

Scott O. Mercer
Matthew G. Bagley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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